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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-1960
TENNESSEE SURVEY
ROBERT E. KENDRICK*

I.

SUBSTANTIVE CRIIVNAL LAW

1. Offenses againstthe Person
(a) Homicide: Parties
(b) Assault and Battery: Defense of Intoxication
(c) Attempt to Procure a Miscarriage
2. Offenses againstProperty
(a) Larceny
(b) Embezzlement
(c) False Pretenses,Bad Check Law
(d) Criminal Trespass
3. Offenses againstMorality and Decency
(a) Contributingto the Delinquency of a Minor
4. Offenses againstthe Public Peace
(a) Inciting to Riot
5. Offenses Affecting the Administration of Governmental Functions
(a) Contempt

II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. Limitations'of Prosecution
(a) Jurisdiction
(b) Venue
(c) Statute of Limitations
(d) FormerJeopardy
2. ProceedingsPreliminaryto Trial
(a) Arrest
(b) Search Warrants
(c) Searches and Seizures Without Warrants
(d) Indictments and Presentments
3. Trial
(a) Speedy Trial
(b) Trial by Jury: Waiver
(c) Selection of Jurors
(d) Evidence
(e) Conduct of Jury
(f) Instructions
(g) Verdict
4. Penalties
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIIV

AL LAW

1. Offenses against the person-(a) Homicide: Parties.-Becauseof
an asserted lack of intention to commit homicide, two persons asked
*

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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the state supreme court in Eager v. State1 to reverse their convictions
of involuntary manslaughter for allegedly, while intoxicated, killing
a pedestrian with an automobile driven by one and directed and aided
by the other. In affirming, it would have been enough to dispose of
this contention to invoke the statutory provision that "manslaughter
is the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or
implied, which may be... involuntary, but in the commission of some
unlawful act,"'2 to call attention to the fact that the killing here was
done in the commission of the unlawful act of driving an automobile
3
upon a public highway while under the influence of an intoxicant,
and to cite precedents to the effect that involuntary manslaughter
occurs when, without intending death or bodily harm, one accidentally
causes the death of another by an unlawful act.4 But the court went
further to observe that the conduct of these defendants in deliberately
and consciously doing an unlawful act, the probable although unintended consequence of which was death, implied such a high degree
of conscious and willful recklessness that even convictions of murder
in the second degree would have been justified.5
The Eager case also involved a question about parties. May an
intoxicated passenger in an automobile driven by an intoxicated
companion be a party to the unlawful act of "driving while intoxicated" so that he, as well as the driver, will be criminally responsible
for a death proximately caused thereby? The court, concluding that
the jury was warranted here in finding that the passenger voluntarily
sat by and permitted without protest a person known to be intoxicated
to operate the vehicle and that he directed and encouraged the latter
in various ways in the commission of the unlawful act, held that
under such facts the passenger and driver are equally guilty parties.
There is considerable authority for so holding the passenger responsible as an aider and abettor or a principal in the second degree for
driving while intoxicated even though he did not do the actual
driving.6 Therefore, as a principal offender 7 in the commission of an
unlawful act, the passenger is responsible to the same extent as the
1. Eager v. State, 325 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1959).

2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2409 (1956).

59-1031 (1956).
4. Wade v. State, 174 Tenn. 248, 124 S.W.2d 710 (1939); Nelson v. State, 65
Tenn. 418 (1873); Lee v. State, 41 Tenn. 61 (1860).
5. Citing Rogers v. State, 196 Tenn. 263, 265 S.W.2d 559 (1954); Ball,
Criminal Law and Procedure-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REy. 825,
826 (1954).
6. 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 990 (12th ed. 1957). See
also Story v. United States, 57 App. D.C. 3, 16 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1926); cert.
denied, 274 U.S. 739 (1927); 5 BLAsHPIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW
3. TENN. CODE ANN. §

AM PRACTICE § 2930 (perm. ed. 1954); 9-10 HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE
LAW 30, 51 (9th ed. 1931).

7. "All persons present, aiding and abetting, or ready and consenting to aid
and abet, in any criminal offense, shall be deemed principal offenders, and
punished as such." TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-109 (1956).
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driver-under the circumstances of this case, for the same degree of
homicide. As Chief Justice Neil pointed out in a concurring opinion,
however the liability of one who occupies an automobile with a
drunken driver is dependent upon the extent of cooperation between
them, for the passenger's presence alone would not be enough to constitute his action aiding and abetting nor himself a principal party.8
(b) Assault and Battery: Defense of Intoxication.-The eminent
jurisprudential and criminal law scholar, Jerome Hall, in a book published this year introduced a chapter on "Intoxication" with the following paragraph:
The penal liability of grossly intoxicated harm-doers raises difficult
theoretical questions, involving the principles of mens rea and concurrence. The case-law also reflects traditional attitudes of marked hostility
toward drunken offenders, which renders sound adjudication harder to
achieve than in insanity cases. And recent research on alcoholism
supports the impression that where gross intoxication and serious harmdoing concur, the criminal law is severe and indiscriminate. 9

One who thoughtfully considers what trial court judges in jury instructions and appellate court judges in opinions have said concerning
intoxication as a defense in reported Tennessee criminal cases may
wonder what the odds are in a single case that this defense could be
successfully raised against the traditional attitudes referred to by
Professor Hall. Will the trial judge state the law free of those attitudes? Will the jury find the facts and apply the law free of those
attitudes? Will the appellate judges in performing their duties be free
of those attitudes?
Most American jurisdictions hold that although "voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime" 10 it may be so gross as to make one
accused of a crime, an element of which is a specific intent, incapable
of possessing such intent and therefore entitled to an acquittal." And
8. 325 S.W.2d at 822-23.
9. HALL, GENERAL PmNCn'LES OF CRIMVNAL LAW 529 (2d ed. 1960).
10. The statement, found in hundreds of American cases, was formulated
by Baron Parke in 1835. Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin 144, 168 Eng. Rep. 1108
(1835). Professor Perkins' response is that neither is anything else an excuse
for a crime, because if conduct is excused there is no crime at all. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 725 (1957).

11. Among such crimes are assault with intent to kill, to wound, to rape
or to rob; burglary (specific intent to commit a felony); larceny and robbery (specific intent to steal); and attempt to commit any crime for which
it must be shown that there was a specific intent to commit the crime charged
to have been attempted. Proof of voluntary drunkenness also may be shown
to negative the existence of particular facts when such knowledge is an
essential element of the crime charged, as in prosecutions for passing counterfeit money or uttering a forged instrument, in which it must be proved that
the accused knew that the money was counterfeit or the instrument forged.
CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMEs 388-89 (6th ed. 1958). However, by weight
of authority in the states that have divided murder into degrees, drunkenness
may be shown to negative the existence of the intent to kill or the delibera-
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no citation is needed for the proposition that one of the essential
elements of the crime of larceny is the animus furandi-the specific
intent to steal. Yet, in 1957, the Tennessee Supreme Court approved,
as "a correct statement of the law" and as being "in substantial
accord" with the applicable rule, the following jury charge: "The
fact that a person is drunk and steals something; that is not a defense
to larceny in Tennessee. In only one instance is that applicable, that
is in cases of murder in the first degree . . . but that law is not
applicable to a case of larceny. So the fact that a person is drunk is
2
not a defense to the crime of larceny, grand or petit.'
During the past year in affirming a conviction for assault and
battery with intent to commit rape, the court in Harris v. State,13 after
holding that defendant's evidence was insufficient to support his
contention that he was so intoxicated that he did not know what he
was doing, went further to say: "[B]ut even if he had been drunk at
the time, especially when not of such character as to dethrone his
reasoning power to such an extent that he was unable to distinguish
between right and wrong, and render him unable to form in his
mind an intent to commit the crime for which he is here charged...
such voluntary drunkenness would be no excuse for the crime here
committed."'14 As authority, the court cited the 1957 decision referred
to above and cases holding that "intoxication is of no value except
in cases where a specific intent is necessary, and that in case of
criminal assault, no intent is requisite other than that evidenced by
the doing of the acts constituting the offense." 5
What do the quoted judicial utterances portend? Of course, one
cannot be sure, but they may indicate an increasing emphasis upon
the rule that voluntary intoxication does not excuse, and a deemphasis of the exculpatory qualification relative to specific intent.10
(c) Attempt to Procure a Miscarriage.-An appeal in error from a
conviction for an attempt to procure a miscarriage 7 presented the
tion and premeditation required to constitute murder in the first degree; but
voluntary drunkenness is no defense to second degree murder, as to which
it is sufficient to show implied malice. Id. at 614-16.
12. Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 649-50, 651, 301 S.W.2d 358, 359-60
(1957).
13. 332 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1960).
14. Id. at 679. (Emphasis added.)
15. The quotation is from a rape case, Steele v. State, 189 Tenn. 424,
430, 225 S.W.2d 260 (1949), and is a statement of the holding in another
rape case, Walden v. State, 178 Tenn. 71, 77, 156 S.W.2d 385, 387 (1941).
16. In addition to authorities cited above, see also on drunkenness as a
defense, WILLIAMS,

CRnMAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART

369-82 (1953).

17. The crime is statutory: "Every person who shall administer any
substance with the intention to procure the miscarriage of a woman or shall
use or employ any instrument or other means with such intent . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) years." TENN. CODE ANx. § 39-302 (1956).
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court in Dupuy v. State18 with a situation for which it could find no
Tennessee case directly in point, and over which the justices divided.
Suspecting a pharmacist of violating criminal code provisions concerning abortion and miscarriage, police had selected a young woman
(not in fact pregnant) to gain his confidence and "set up a situation
to find him guilty of violating the law,"19 ; as the dissenting opinion
puts it, the police "planted a trap" for him.20 At her solicitation, the
pharmacist "finally agreed to come to her assistance" 21 for an agreed
price. Afterwards they met at a motel selected by him as the place
to perform the operation and entered a room, where he took from a
kit and laid out the instruments to be used. Feigning nervousness, she
drank some beer, which he procured at her request. He turned the
bed covers down and spread a piece of cellophane over the sheet, filled
his hypodermic needle with penicillin, and told the woman to disrobe
and "get ready." Thereupon, she walked out of the room, and the
officers came in and made the arrest.
There is no indication in Dupuy that entrapment was raised as a
defense, perhaps because the court in previous cases had indicated
that such a defense is not recognized in Tennessee.22 It is difficult
to believe, however, that the very desirable and generally acceptable
concept of entrapment would never be utilized by Tennessee courts.
Whereas traps are justified in catching those bent on crime, it is
intolerable for the state to use its own officers, or agents provocateur,
to instigate crimes by sowing the seeds of criminal ideas in innocent
minds and thereby to bring about offenses that otherwise would never
have been committed. Under the latter circumstances, counsel should
not hesitate to raise the defense for it is almost inconceivable that
it should then be ruled out.
The justices also agreed in a majority opinion, a concurring opinion,
and a dissenting opinion that the factual impossibility of completing
an abortion on a woman who is not pregnant does not exclude the
possibility of an attempt to procure a miscarriage of her.3 Inasmuch
as the Tennessee statute is in terms applicable to certain conduct of an
accused "with the intention to procure the miscarriage of a woman,"
without specifying, as do statutes of some other states, a "pregnant"
18. 325 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1959).
19. Id. at 239.

20. Id. at 242.
21. Id. at 239.

22. Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 40, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1950); Thomas v. State,
182 Tenn. 380, 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945). For an annotation on entrapment to

commit or attempt abortion, see 53 A.L.R.2d 1156 (1957).
23. Justice Burnett's dissenting opinion, however, indicates his feeling that
the other justices think that a woman must be pregnant before a conviction
can be had under the statute. 325 S.W.2d at 243. But, as Justice Tomlinson's
concurring opinion points out, such a position by the majority does not
appear from their opinion. Id. at 240.
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woman, the conclusion on impossibility as a defense is clearly correct. 24
It was another recurring attempt problem which split the court in
this case: Were the defendant's acts only in preparation for committing the intended ultimate crime, and therefore not an attempt? Or
were they steps taken in the direction of actual perpetration, and
therefore an attempt? Otherwise stated, given that to constitute a
criminal attempt there must be both an intent to commit a specific
crime and an overt act directed to its commission which goes beyond
preparation and is apparently suited for the intended purpose,25 how
can one tell when the overt act is beyond the preparatory zone? The
scholars agree only that it is a difficult problem, 26 and that actually no
definite line can be drawn in advance since each case must be determined on its own facts. 27 But, as Jerome Hall points out, "Yet trial
judges instruct juries; appellate courts reverse convictions, and alas!
They must give reasons why the conduct in issue constituted 'mere
preparation.' "2 And there was the rub in Dupuy. Reversing the
conviction, most of the court determined that the defendant had made
full preparation for unlawfully procuring a miscarriage, that he had
done so with criminal intent, but that an overt act was wholly lacking.
The dissenting justice thought that defendant's conduct, including
giving the woman beer to settle her nerves, amounted to overt acts
of beginning the operation, although interrupted just short of touching
the body, and were beyond the stage of preparation.2 9 Tennessee
judges faced with the preparation-prepetration problem in future
attempt cases will not be likely to find the reasons offered in support
of the Dupuy opinions very hopeful; but neither would they, those
30
behind the decisions of other jurisdictions.
24. 2

WHARTON,

1393 (1956).

op. cit. supra note 6, at § 748. See also Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d

25. 1 WHARTON, Op. cit. supra note 6, at §§ 73-75.
26. "Although it is certain that an overt act is essential, such act is difficult
of definition." CianK and MVARsHAmL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 220. "[T]he
difficult question [is that] of distinguishing them on tenable grounds." HALL,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 577. "The difference between the two [preparation
and perpetration] may not be 'wide' as a matter of fact. As one approaches
the other we may find a difficult 'twilight zone' rather than a sharp and clear
dividing line." PERK=S, op. cit. supra note 10, at 482.
27. HALL, op. cit. supra, at 577 ("The one point of universal agreement.").
28. Id. at 577-78.
29. Justice Burnett dissenting, 325 S.W.2d at 242-43. Justice Burnett expressed his additional opinion that, at any rate, what constitutes an overt
act is a question of fact for the jury and that here the jury verdict of guilty,
founded upon proper instructions, showed what its determination had been. Id.
at 243-44. The other justices apparently were of the opinion that in this
case there was no evidence to support the jury's verdict, which must then
be set aside. Id. at 240, 242.
30. Some other attempted abortion cases will illustrate the point. Holding
the evidence sufficient to support conviction: People v. Bowlby, 135 Cal. App.
2d 519, 287 P.2d 547, 53 A.L.R.2d 1147 (1955) (defendant accepted money,
directed woman into room containing instruments and materials commonly
used in abortions, had her disrobe and lie on table with feet in stirrups,
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2. Offenses against Property-(a) Larceny.--In a civil case of
interest to the criminal law field,3 ' the state supreme court rejected the contention of an insurance company that its automobile
"theft or larceny" policy does not cover robbery, the court correctly pointing out that larceny is necessarily included in the
crime of robbery.3 2 Although the facts were that an escaped
convict at gunpoint compelled a representative of the insured to
transport him in the automobile several hundred miles before
he abandoned it when it became disabled, and that therefore
donned rubber gloves, made a bimanual vaginal examination, lubricated a
vaginal speculum, but did not use any of the instruments or materials on

her-held: defendant had unequivocally committed himself to abortion);
People v. Berger, 131 Cal. App. 2d 127, 280 P.2d 136 (1955) (defendant
received money, arranged a laboratory pregnancy test for woman, went to
her home with a woman accomplice, covered window with sheet, made ready
antiseptics and towels and gauze, sterilized surgical instruments, but did not
touch her-held: sterilization was first step in the operation, an act done
toward committing the crime); People v. Reed, 128 Cal. App. 2d 499, 275
P.2d 633 (1954) (financial arrangements made, defendant told woman to get
on table in operating room so he could dilate uterus and scrape her, took a
weighted speculum in hands and ran cold water over it, but did not touch
her-held: defendant had started to employ means to procure miscarriage);
People v. Raffngton, 98 Cal. App. 2d 455, 220 P.2d 967 (1950) (defendant received money, had woman get on table, sterilized instruments, prepared other
materials he had told her would be used in the operation, manipulated her
abdomen, but did not do anything internally-held: evidence sufficient to
convict for an attempt); People v. Conrad, 102 App. Div. 566, 92 N.Y. Supp.
606 (1905), aff'd, 182 N.Y. 529, 74 N.E. 1122 (1905) (defendant received
money, had room in home prepared for operation, placed woman on table
with legs in position for examination and operation, sterilized instruments
and hands, syringed her private parts, took speculum in hands, but did not
use it or other means of procuring abortion-held: intent plus use of means
necessary to lead up to the final use of an instrument that would work a
consummation constitutes the offense).
Holding the evidence insufficient to justify a conviction: People v. Buffum,
40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953) (making arrangements for abortions to be
performed in Mexico and transporting women there for that purpose are
acts of preparation); People v. Gallardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 257 P.2d 29 (1953)
(receiving money, making arrangements with woman to do abortion, meeting
her at hospital, and preparing hospital cards and records are acts of preparation); People v. Cummings, 343 P.2d 944 (Cal. App. 1959) (defendant participated in making arrangements for an abortion, received woman into his office
for that purpose, but no proof that any one administered any medicine or
substance or used any instrument upon her-held: without such proof the
elements of the offense are entirely lacking); Commonwealth v. Willard, 179
Pa. Super. 368, 116 A.2d 751 (1955) (defendant accepted money, went into
room with woman and instructed her to remove underclothing, and made
instruments ready for abortion-held: intent to commit abortion shown but
evidence not sufficient to establish attempt). Cf. Fretwell v. State, 43 Tex.
Crim. 501, 67 S.W. 1021 (1902) (defendant prescribed medicine to be taken
within three days calculated to produce abortion, but woman took in small
amounts over 10 days not calculated to produce abortion-held: not enough to
establish guilt of the offense).
31. Throneberry v. Resolute Ins. Co., 332 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. 1960).
32. "Larceny [is] an essential element of the offense of robbery . . .
robbery is a compound or aggravated larceny, composed of the crime of larceny from the person with the aggravation of force." 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
LAw AND PROCEDURE

§ 547 (12th ed. Anderson 1957). The precedents in Ten-

nessee begin with Tucker v. State, 50 Tenn. 484 (1872).
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the wrongdoer did not during the journey manually operate it himself,33 the court held that the caption element of the crime was
present. By using the gun to gain control of the automobile, he
committed a trespass; and, by compelling its use for his own ends,
he took possession from the owner without the owner's consent,
albeit the court referred to this as "constructive possession. " 34 The
court might have, as did an Alabama court in a criminal case involving similar pertinent facts, 35 called this a trespassory taking of "full
possession" from the owner and a reduction of the driver to the status
of a robot, since the wrongdoer was in complete control of the automobile, depriving the owner of its use without consent, and able to
assume its manual operation whenever he pleased. It is not apparent
from the report of the instant case that the wrongdoer's intent in
taking the automobile was ever in contention, probably because of
an earlier supreme court decision that in automobile theft insurance
cases it matters not whether the wrongdoer intended to deprive the
owner of the use of his automobile permanently or temporarily, 36
although certainly it would be a part of the state's case in a larceny
37
or robbery prosecution to prove intent permanently to deprive.
The asportation element of larceny was involved in Caruso v.
State.38 If the other elements of this crime are present, is the moving
of another person's safe five feet outside of his office into a separate
33. When the automobile became disabled and the wrongdoer decided to
abandon it, he steered it into a ditch while others pushed. It is clear, however, that the court considered him sufficiently in possession during the
journey to satisfy the caption element even without the latter circumstance. 332
S.W.2d at 228.
34. Perhaps the court had in mind the statement in Williams v. State, 186
Tenn. 252, 255, 209 S.W.2d 29, 31 (1948), that "the felonious taking possession,
actual or constructive" is required. The authority cited there, Defrese v.
State, 50 Tenn. 53, 60 (1870), states that the trespass may be constructive.
35. Root v. State, 32 Ala. App. 253, 25 So. 2d 180 (1945).
36. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. House, 163 Tenn. 585, 45 S.W.2d 55
(1932). There, one with an automobile "theft, robbery or pilferage" policy
was permitted to recover even though it was determined that the wrongdoer
took it for only a temporary purpose. The court reasoned that a "joy-riding"
statute, making it a "felony, punishable as larceny" to take another's motor
vehicle without permission whether intended as a permament or temporary
appropriation, TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-504 (1956), had the effect of putting
both kinds of appropriation on the same plane.
37. With the exception of a prosecution under the "joy-riding" statute discussed in note 5 supra, of course. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Supp.
1960), § 39-4202 (1956); Poster v. Andrews, 183 Tenn. 544, 548, 194 S.W.2d
337, 340-41 (1946). "[I]n order to constitute robbery, it was essential 'that
the taking should at the time of manucaption, have been with larcenous
intent.' . . . In other words if the [escapees] . . . had taken the car merely
for use in making their escape, but not with intent to steal it, that is, to
appropriate it permanently, then there would have been no robbery ....
The
question of intent was a question for the jury." Root v. State, 247 Ala. 514,
25 So. 2d 182 (1946). See also People v. O'Neal, 2 Cal. App. 2d 551, 38 P.2d
430 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1934); Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209
(1958); State v. Smith, 68 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1934); State v. Sala, 63 Nev. 270,
169 P.2d 524 (1946).
38. 326 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1958).
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room in the same building sufficient as a "carrying away"? While
there seems to be no reported Tennessee case prior to this one concerning whether such a movement meets the asportation requirement,
the court's holding in the affirmative in the instant case is consistent
with the well-nigh universally accepted common law view.39 The
technical requirement may be satisfied by the slightest start of the
carrying away movement,40 and may be complete even though the
41
chattel has not been removed from the owner's premises.
Where one obtains possession of another's goods by trick or fraud,
intending to appropriate them to his own use but the owner intending
to give up possession only as distinguished from title, by fiction a
trespassory taking is said to occur, making the wrongdoer (who does
not have lawful possession at any time) guilty of a kind of larceny
which has come to be called "larceny by trick. '42 This species of
larceny, rarely involved in reported Tennessee cases, 43 required the
court's attention in Metcalf v. State.44 There, two gamblers had been
convicted of larceny by trick for obtaining money from three soldiers
in a game of "three card monte" (a sleight of hand operation in which
the dealer, after betting the other player that he cannot pick up a
certain card among three dealt face down, skillfully manipulates the
cards so that the latter is deceived into picking up one of the two
wrong cards which is made to appear the card he seeks). The supreme court reached the proper decision in reversing the conviction,
because by definition larceny by trick was not perpetrated when title
as well as possession was passed over by the victims to the card
cheats. However, the court failed to rest the decision on that
ground. Rather, it curiously emphasized the fact that the victims of
this game must have known that the dealer was handling the cards
so as to confuse them and that it would have been possible for them
in every case to pick up the winning card, citing two earlier Tennessee
cases for the proposition that obtaining money or other goods in a
swindling transaction in which the victim has no chance of winning
is larceny. The first of the cases, Defrese v. State,45 after correctly
stating the difference between larceny by trick and false pretenses,
39. See cases cited in 19 A.L.R. 724 (1922) and 144 A.L.R. 1383 (1943) for
examples.
40. PERKINS, CRIINAL LAW 221 (1957).

41. People v. Bradovich, 305 Mich. 329, 9 N.W.2d 560 (1943); Delk v. State,

64 Miss. 77, 1 So. 9 (1886); State v. Gazell, 30 Mo. 92 (1860).

42. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 112 (1934). The interesting historical develop-

ment of larceny by trick is recounted in HALL, THEFT,LAw AN SocIETY 40-45
(2d ed. 1952).

43. Hall v. State, 65 Tenn. 522 (1873); Defrese v. State, 50 Tenn. 53 (1870).
See also Hunter v. Moore, 38 Tenn. App. 533, 276 S.W.2d 754 (E.S. 1954); Scott,
Criminal Law and Procedure-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAN. L. REV. 992,
993 (1955).
44. 329 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1959).
45. 50 Tenn. 53 (1870).
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construed a statute then in force as making "it larceny to use any
bailment or agency merely as the means of procuring possession of
property, with an intent at the time to make a fraudulent appropriation thereof: Code, 4679."46 The Defrese decision also emphasizes the
fact that the victim in that case was intimidated into parting with his
goods rather than parting with them willingly. But the point of
whether the victim had a chance of winning was not even discussed
in Defrese. The second case is Hall v. State47 in which a jury charge
that "to fraudulently induce the prosecutor to play at cards when he
has no chance to win, may be larceny" was sustained as falling
within the principle of the Defrese decision. By these odd leaps from
Defrese to Hall to Metcalf, the supreme court seems to have "reasoned" itself into a corner so that, short of ignoring or repudiating
such reasoning, if it should be faced next with a case in which a
swindler or "con man" has without coercion induced a victim into
parting with title as well as possession in goods in an operation in
which the latter has no chance of winning, it would be required,
without statutory support, to uphold a conviction for larceny by trick
as a matter of state common law! If this is common law in Tennessee,
it is hardly that elsewhere. Almost invariably the victims of these
"games" intend to pass to the swindler title as well as possession to
their goods, in the greedy hopes of realizing great windfalls for themselves. A crime is committed all right; but it is the statutory crime
of false pretenses, 48 of course, and the prosecution should be for that.
The court in Metcalf pointed out that under the circumstances there
involved the swindler's conduct "may very well be regarded as a false
pretense,"49 but it would have been a false pretense (not larceny by
trick) regardless of the circumstance that the victims had a chance
of winning.50
(b) Embezzlement.-The court impliedly recognized that, where
one is charged with having converted to his own use funds received
by him in behalf of his employer, it must be shown that such funds
were converted before they were put into the employer's possession
and not from the latter's possession afterward. 51 While recognizing
that by statute the refusal or wilful neglect of any public or private
officer, clerk, or agent to pay over money or property placed in his
care upon demand therefor by the person or authority entitled to it
46. Id. at 62.
47. 65 Tenn. 522 (1873).

48. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1901 (1956).

49. 329 S.W.2d at 826.
50. A number of states have enacted separate statutes specifically dealing
with the confidence game as a variation of theft. CLARK & MARSHALL, CHIMES
§ 12.28 (6th ed. 1958).
51. Hopper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1959).
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constitutes prima facie evidence of embezzlement, 52 the court
approved a jury instruction that the fact that one accused of the
crime has repaid the money allegedly converted is no defense and
has no bearing on guilt or innocence. 53 Further, it interpreted the
"embezzlement by public officer" statute 54 as covering "any person
charged with the collection, safekeeping, and so on, of money or property belonging to the state or any county."55
Tennessee has a statute making unlawful the misapplication of contract payments, which offense the supreme court has treated as being
in the nature of embezzlement.5 6 The statute reads in pertinent part:
"Any contractor . . . who, with intent to defraud,7 shall use the
proceeds of any payment made to him on account of improving certain real property for any other purpose than to pay for labor performed on, or materials furnished by his order for, this specific
improvement, while any amount for which he may be or become
liable for such labor or materials remains unpaid, shall be guilty of a
59
felony and punished accordingly." 58 The question in Miller v. State
was whether retention of a part of the contract price by an independent contractor for his own labor in making realty improvements
contracted for is a misapplication to that extent, within the meaning
of the statute, of money paid him by the realty owner when there
remained unpaid amounts due for materials purchased and used by
the contractor in the improvements, which materials he had obligated himself to furnish. Such action was held to be a prohibited
misapplication, and a conviction based thereon was affirmed, the
court concluding that a contractor who toils in his own service to
reduce expenses and to increase the hoped-for profits of his contract
is not a laborer in the common sense. 60 While the interpretation and
application accorded the statute in the Miller case undoubtedly are
consistent with legislative intent,61 there might be some doubt as to
whether the language of this penal statute is sufficiently clear in
meaning to that effect from a constitutional standpoint.
(c) False Pretenses, Bad Check Law.-Given a situation in which a
man has deposited a small amount of money in a bank checking
52. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-4233 (1956).

53. Hopper v. State, supra note 51.
§ 39-4231 (1956).
54. TENN.CoDE A'N.
55. 326 S.W.2d at 454.
56. State v. Overton, 193 Tenn. 171, 245 S.W.2d 188 (1951).
57. Use of funds contrary to the provisions of the quoted code section is
prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud. TENN. CODE AN. § 64-1142
(1956).
58. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 64-1140 (1956) (Emphasis added.).
59. 332 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1960).
60. The court cited the civil case of Rogers v. Dexter & P.R. Co., 85 Me. 372,
27 Atl. 257 (1893).
61. State v. Overton, 193 Tenn. 171, 245 S.W.2d 188 (1951).
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account in the name of a fictitious association, issued a check thereon
in a much larger amount with the association as drawer and his
individual self as payee, and indorsed it to another party and received money therefor-may the wrongdoer be indicted under the
general false pretenses statute62 or must he be indicted under the
64
63
more specialized bad check law? The state in Clardy v. State
chose the former route, obtained a conviction therefor in the trial
court, but had its judgment reversed by the supreme court which
held in effect that the latter route should have been taken. The supreme court relied on a precedent holding that the bad check law
had superseded or repealed so much of the previously enacted false
pretense statute as might otherwise apply.6 5 Perhaps the state in
Clardy proceeded as it did because the bad check law makes punishable the obtaining of money, with fraudulent intent, by means of a
check of which the wrongdoer is the "maker or drawer," whereas
the individual defendant's name in the instant case appeared on the
check only as payee and indorser. If defendant obtained the money
by indorsement, the state seems to have reasoned, his conduct does
not fit the wording of the bad check statute. However, the supreme
court held that the gravamen of the charge lies, not in the issuing of
a check, but in fraudulently obtaining money by means of it and
that the words "maker or drawer" in the bad check law are to be
meanunderstood in their ordinary sense rather than in the technical
66
ing imputed to them in the negotiable instruments law.

(d) Criminal Trespass.-The court reversed a conviction for the
statutory offense of cutting timber from the lands of another without
the consent of the owner of the timber,6 7 because the prosecuting
witness had never been in actual or constructive possession of the
land involved and had not established title thereto by deraignment
from the state or from a common source. 68
62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-19014 (1956).
63.. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-190 (1956).

64. 332 S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. 1960).

65. Haley v. State, 156 Tenn. 85, 299 S.W. 799 (1927). It should be noted
that at the time of the Haley decision the two acts were repugnant, the bad
check law providing that an offender should be guilty of a misdemeanor
where the funds obtained by check were below a certain figure and the
earlier false pretenses statute making the offense at the same level a felony.
This repugnance does not exist under the express wording of the statutes
in the current code. Without such legislative background, a different result
might be reached now from that of the Haley case if the statutes as presently
worded were being initially interpreted and applied.
Tenn. 33, 206 S.W. 182 (1918).
66. Citing State v. Cooley, 141
2
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-45 1 (1956).

68. Yates v. State, 332 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1960). For further discussion, see

Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REV.

1197, 1214 (1960) and Roady, Real Property-960 Tennessee Survey, 13
VAND. L. REv. 1241, 1247 (1960).

1960]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

1071

3. Offenses against Morality and Decency-(a) Contributing to the
Delinquency of a Minor.-Evidence that defendant, a thirty-seven year
old man, signed an agreement with a sixteen year old girl relative to
making her a model, travelled in several states and registered in
hotels with her as man and wife, had her pose for pictures in the
nude, and persuaded her to sleep partially nude with him, was
sufficient to make out a case of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, 69 the supreme court held, whether or not he had sexual intercourse with her.70 The court added that the offense may involve a
single act or a course of conduct and may be committed in an unlimited variety of ways "which tend to produce or encourage or to continue conduct with a child which would amount to delinquent
conduct" 7' and which conform to "modern and human ideas of what
72
is delinquency in society."
4. Offenses against the Public Peace.-(a) Inciting to Riot.-In Kasper v. State,7 3 the plaintiff in error, who had been convicted of the common law offense of inciting to riot, assigned as error that there is no
such offense in the state because the common law has been expressly
repealed by the adoption of the state and federal constitutions and
no legislation has since been enacted to cover the subject. The
supreme court correctly overruled that assignment because the state
constitution 4 and judicial precedents7 5 are to the contrary. It was
also on sound ground in holding that words inciting to riot are not
76
protected as free speech.
5. Offenses Affecting the Administrationof Governmental Functions.
77
-(a) Contempt.-An individual found to be practicing dentistry
unlawfully without a license7 8 was enjoined from further such conduct, the state having proceeded against him under statutes making
69. TENN. CODE AN.

§ 37-270 (Supp. 1959).

70. Birdsell v. State, 330 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959).
71. Id. at 5, citing Commonwealth v. Stroik, 175 Pa. Super. 10, 102 A.2d
239 (1954).

72. Id. at 6.

73. 326 S.W.2d 664 (Tenn. 1959).

74. "All laws and ordinances now in force and use in this state, not inconsistent with this Constitution, shall continue in force and use until they
shall expire or be altered or repealed by the Legislature .... " TENN. CONST.
art. 11, § 1.

75. "[T]he entire body of the common law, as it existed when the Constitution went into effect, was made the law of the land by that instrument."
Henley v. State, 98 Tenn. 665, 707, 41 S.W. 352 (1897). See also McGinnis v.
State, 28 Tenn. 43, 49 Am. Dec. 697 (1848).
76. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem.

These include . . . those which by their very

utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-537 (Supp. 1959).
78. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-536 (Supp. 1959).
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the unlawful practice of a profession a public nuisance subject to
abatement as any other public nuisance, 9 that is, by injunction." He
was later convicted in crininal court of contempt of court upon a
finding that he had resumed the practice of dentistry in violation of
the injunction and was sentenced to serve a jail term and to pay a
fine.8 ' On appeal he argued that the criminal court lacked jurisdiction; but the supreme court held that that court had jurisdiction by
statute,82 and that the contempt is criminal rather than civil because
the violated injunction had been issued to restrain defendant from
committing a criminal offense. 83 In the latter conclusion, the court
was observing the generally recognized distinction between criminal
and civil contempt-that criminal contempt proceedings are instituted to vindicate public authority and the dignity of the court rather
8 4
than to enforce civil rights and remedies of private parties to suits.
II. CRnUMMnAL PROCEDURE
1. Limitations of Prosecution-(a)Jurisdiction.-The supreme court
held that the grand jury which indicted, and the criminal court which
convicted, a defendant of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that the title in the
code on juveniles 85 does not require that a juvenile court first investigate and find an accused guilty of delinquency and swear out a
warrant before a grand jury may return an indictment. 86 This interpretation seems consistent with the legislative purposes behind the
juvenile act. Although the act gives the juvenile court both the power
to have those alleged to be contributing to the delinquency of minors
arrested and in cases of guilty pleas to pass judgment upon them and
the power to bind over to the grand jury those who plead not
guilty, it nowhere attempts to restrict the grand jury's general
inquisitional powers8 7 nor the state's authority otherwise to prosecute
88
according to normal procedure.
There should be no doubt that a criminal court has jurisdiction in
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-313 (1956).
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-311 (1956).

81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-312 (1956) provides that one violating a perma-

nent injunction granted under provisions for abating nuisances shall be
subject to punishment for contempt-a jail or workhouse term and a fine.
82. TENN.

CODE ANN. §

23-302 (1956).

83. Hooper v. State ex tel. Nichol, 325 S.W.2d 565 (Tenn. 1959).
84. 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1332 (12th ed. Anderson
1957). For another Tennessee decision in which the contempts are distinguished, see O'Brien v. State ex rel. Bibb, 26 Tenn. App. 270, 170 S.W.2d 931
(1942).
85.

TENN. CODE ANN. tit

87.

TENN. CODE

37 (Supp. 1959).

86. Birdsell v. State, 330 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959).
ANN.

§

40-1605

(1956).

88. For a like conclusion, see People v. Dritz, 259 App. Div. 210, 18

N.Y.S.2d 455 (1940).
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criminal contempt matters, and the court so holds.8 9
But a criminal court does not have jurisdiction to determine, even
after acquitting one charged with possessing a male deer without
antlers,90 whether or not goods seized as contraband in connection
with the accused's arrest actually are contraband and, in the event
it decides in the negative, to order them returned, because the state
game and fish laws 9' provide another exclusive remedy for the
recovery of goods so seized. 92 It would seem expedient for the court
in these cases to have jurisdiction, and hardship to the claimant
undoubtedly would be alleviated if it had; but this, of course, is a
matter for legislative consideration.
(b) Venue.-Where there was evidence that an accused in one
county with criminal intent pocketed checks which he had received
in behalf of his employer but without accounting for them and that
he subsequently cashed them in a second county, the court held that
venue for the embezzlement prosecution was properly laid in the
first county.93 In so doing, the court reiterated its position that venue
in a criminal case may be shown by a preponderance of the evidence,
and that the evidence may be circumstantial only, because, as it had
pointed out a few months earlier in another embezzlement case,
venue is not an element of a criminal offense but simply fixes the
right of the court to try the case.94
(c) Statute of Limitations.-In a misdemeanor prosecution for an
offense allegedly committed on September 10, 1956, defendants were
indicted on September 3, 1957; but this indictment was quashed upon
the state's motion on December 19, 1958. Meanwhile, however, another indictment had been returned against these parties on December
12, 1958, but was sent back on January 6, 1959, to the grand jury by
order of the court for a correction, which the grand jury made on
that date. The court then sustained defendant's motion to quash the
second indictment as being barred by the twelve months statute of
limitations on misdemeanors,95 because that indictment showed that
it was returned more than two years after the date shown therein as
96
the date of the crime. On appeal by the state, in State v. Comstock
89. Hooper v. State ex rel. Nichol, 325 S.W.2d 565 (Tenn. 1959).
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 51-425 (1956).
91. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 51-707 to -715 (1956).

92. State v. McCrary, 326 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1959). See also Findlay v.
Monroe, 196 Tenn. 690, 270 S.W.2d 325 (1954); Monroe v. State, 194 Tenn. 519,
253 S.W.2d 734 (1952).
93. Hooper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1959); Morgan, Procedure and

Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1960).

94. Blackwood v. State, 325 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1959).
v. State, 187 Tenn. 592, 216 S.W.2d 323 (1948).
95. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-204 (1956).
96. 326 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1959).

See also Gilliland
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the supreme court interpreted a provision that the statute be tolled
when the indictment is dismissed "and a new indictment . . . is
ordered to be preferred" 97 as inapplicable, standing alone, because
here the first indictment had not been quashed before another was
brought and because, instead of the judge ordering a new indictment
to be preferred, the second indictment was brought simply on the
district attorney general's initiative. However, the court reasoned
that another provision that "when an indictment . . . is quashed ...
the time during the pendency of such indictment . . . shall not be
reckoned within the time limited by this chapter, so as to bar any
new indictment or presentment for the same offense" 98 as applied
to this case would toll the statute while the first indictment was
pending.9 9 But, because of the rule that where an indictment is
brought after the statutory period has expired it must be pleaded and
proved that certain specific facts have tolled the statute, 00 the judgment of the trial court here in quashing the second indictment when
on its face the prosecution appeared barred by a lapse of more than
twelve months was affirmed.
(d) Former Jeopardy.-In rather typical language, the Tennessee
Constitution provides "that no person shall, for the same offense, be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' 0' The supreme court had to
decide in two cases during the survey period whether individuals
had been tried twice for the "same offense."
The Eager'0 2 case involved defendants who allegedly, while intoxicated, ran over and killed another person by automobile. Did an
acquittal of the misdemeanor of failing to stop and give names after
an accident entitle them to plead autrefois acquit and former jeopardy
in bar of a subsequent homicide prosecution under an indictment stating on its face the same facts as did the previous one?
The defendant in the Harris0 3 case allegedly broke into and entered
the dwelling of a woman one night with the intention to steal money
but, after arousing the occupant, struck her, got into bed with her,
and did certain acts against her will in an effort to have sexual intercourse with her. Did a conviction of burglary bar on double jeopardy
grounds a subsequent prosecution of that defendant upon the same
factual situation for the offense of assault with intent to commit rape?
Although other tests have been advanced (such as the "same trans97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-207 (1956).
98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-208 (1956).

99. For other cases, see Annot., 90 A.L.R. 452, 459 (1934) and supplemental
decisions.
100. State v. Shaw, 113 Tenn. 536, 82 S.W. 480 (1904).
101. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
102. Eager v. State, 325 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1959).
103. Harris v. State, 332 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1960).
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action" test, the "one act and one intent" test, 04 and the "same offense
in law and fact" 105 test) for determining former jeopardy questions,
the more widely used "evidence" test 106 is the one in effect in Tennessee. As the court stated it in Eager, "[T]he offenses are not the same
if upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is required, which
is not necessary to be proved in the trial of the other although some
of the same acts may be necessary to be proved in the trial of each.
In other words it seems that the double jeopardy proposition is di107
rected to the identity of the offense and not to the act."'
If one accepts the "evidence" test, it would be difficult to find a
basis for quarreling with the conclusion reached both in Eager and in
Harris that the offenses were not the "same" so that the acquittal in
one case, and the conviction in the other, did not bar a subsequent
prosecution.
2. ProceedingsPreliminaryto Trial-(a) Arrest.-Law enforcement
officers, upon arrival at a residence at about 1:30 a.m. in response to
a telephone call reporting screams there, saw signs of a break-in,
and a man jump up inside and try to run away. The officers halted
the man, arrested him, and heard his oral confession that he had
entered in order to steal and had decided to rape a woman occupant
whom he found in bed. After conviction of the arrestee for assault
with intent to rape, he challenged by assignment in error on appeal
the validity of the arrest warrant originally issued. Overruling the
assignment, the supreme court in the Harris'0 8 case said that under
those circumstances as shown by the record it was immaterial
whether the warrant was good or bad, because the arrest would have
been proper without a warrant. That is unquestionably correct under
the Tennessee law of arrest. 09 But even if the arrest had been unlawful, that would not have invalidated the conviction of the arrestee
resulting from a trial itself free from error,110 the court observing
104. E.g., Spannel v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 418, 203 S.W. 357 (1918).
105. Note, 20 HARV. L. REv. 642 (1907).

106. 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 84, at § 144. See also 2 UNDERHILL,

CRIMNAL EVIDENCE § 480 (5th ed. 1956); Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense,

and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949); Parker, Some Aspects of
Double Jeopardy,25 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 188 (1951).
107. 325 S.W.2d at 819-20 (citing numerous cases).
108. Supra note 103.
109. "An officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (1) For a public
offense committed or a breach of the peace threatened in his presence. (2)

When the person has committed a felony, though not in his presence. (3)
When a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for
believing the person arrested to have committed it. (4) On a charge made
upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony of the person arrested."
TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-803 (1956).

For comment, see Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L. REV.

509, 560-82 (1949).

110. Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, supra note 109, at 650. See
340, 209 N.W. 81 (1926).

also People v. Miller, 235 Mich.
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that there is no constitutional immunity from an unlawful arrest."'
(b) Search Warrants.-The Tennessee Code provides that a search
warrant "can only be issued on a probable cause, supported by affidavit,""i 2 that the complainant's affidavit "must set forth facts tending
to establish the grounds of the application, or probable cause for
believing that they exist,""13 and that "if the magistrate is satisfied
of the existence of the grounds of the application, or that there is
probable ground to believe their existence" he shall issue the warrant." 4 If the magistrate in issuing a search warrant determines that
there is probable cause, is that action subject to review? There is a
series of Tennessee decisions to the effect that this judicial act is not
reviewable provided the affidavit is regular on its face, showing material evidence to support the issuance of the warrant and not indicating
fraud or collusion.115 What if the affiant has no personal knowledge
of the existence of grounds calling for a search warrant, can a warrant then properly issue on "his information and belief"? Not on
that alone, said the court in 1923 in Elliott v. State,"6 because "when
an affidavit is made on information and belief it should disclose the
nature and source of the information so that the magistrate himself
can determine whether probable cause exists." Otherwise, reasoned
the court in Elliott, "the act of the magistrate in issuing the warrant
would not be based upon any judicial discretion, but upon the discretion of the affant. ' 'i i 7 But, what about the sufficiency of an affidavit on information and belief when the basis of belief is information
obtained from persons whose names are not disclosed?" 8 Undoubtedly
there are many instances where officers are reluctant to reveal the
identity of their informants for fear that these sources of information
would "dry up" as a result. Subsequent to the Elliott case, in two
cases concerning the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor,
the court held that the Elliott phrase, "source of the information," did
not require that the name of the informant be disclosed when the
affiant officers recite that their informant is a reliable person" 9 or
believed by them to be reliable, 20 because "it is for the magistrate
111. 332 S.W.2d at 680. See also Satterfield v. State, 196 Tenn. 573, 269

S.W.2d 607 (1954).

112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-503 (1956).
113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-504 (1956).
114. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-505 (1956).

115. Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583, 315 S.W.2d 99 (1958), 12 VAND. L.
Gallimore v. State, 173 Tenn. 178, 116 S.W.2d 1001 (1938);
Reed v. State, 162 Tenn. 643, 39 S.W.2d 749 (1931).
REV. 1140 (1959);

116. 148 Tenn. 414, 415-16, 256 S.W. 431 (1923).

117. Ibid.

118. The cases elsewhere are in "more or less hopeless confusion on this
question." 4 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 84, at § 1543.

119. Gallimore v. State, 173 Tenn. 178, 181, 116 S.W.2d 1001, 1002 (1938).
120. Stroud v. State, 159 Tenn. 263, 267, 17 S.W.2d 899, 900 (1929).
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himself to determine whether, in any case before him, it is essential
that the name of an informant, otherwise shown to him to be a
reliable person, shall be given.' 121 In the recent case of O'Brien v.
State, 22 the plaintiff in error cited the Elliott case and argued that the
trial judge in his case erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained
by a search warrant, allegedly void because based on information
and belief without disclosing "the nature and source of the information." In affirming the conviction the supreme court said it did not
believe the Elliott case to be in point, and cited one of the intervening
liquor transportation cases. Additionally, the court remarked that
"in determining whether or not probable cause exists.
. . the
issuing magistrate performs a judicial act which is not subject to
review by the court unless probable cause is not shown on the face
of the warrant."12 3 Concluding that the affidavit showed probable
cause, the court held that it could not be collaterally attacked in the
trial court after the return of the indictment. Perhaps future decisions will be more instructive as to when a warrant would be invalid
for not showing probable cause on its face.
In Gerchman v. State1r one convicted of housebreaking and larceny as against the property of X, appealed, assigning as error the
admission in evidence of the goods allegedly stolen by him from X,
but which officers had seized in the defendant's dwelling under a
search warrant for certain other articles which he was suspected of
having stolen from Y. The supreme court affirmed, acknowledging
the general rule that a search warrant for specific articles does not
authorize the seizure of things not specified therein,12 5 but holding
that it is not an unreasonable search and seizure for officers lawfully
within premises for one purpose to obtain evidence there which they
recognize as connected with a different crime. This is the generally
126
accepted view.
27
(c) Searches and Seizures without Warrants.1
-The Tennessee
1 28
Constitution prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures,

121. Gallimore v. State, supra note 119, at 181, 116 S.W.2d at 1002.
122. 326 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1959).
123. Id. at 764. (Emphasis added.)
124. 332 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. 1960).

125. Accord, Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); People v.
So. 613 (1928); State v. Muetzel, 121 Ore. 561, 254 Pac. 1010 (1927).
126. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Reynolds v.
State, 136 Miss. 329, 101 So. 485 (1924); State v. McKindel, 148 Wash. 237, 268
Pac. 593 (1928). See also, Perkins, supra note 109, at 624.
127. In addition to the cases reviewed herein, the supreme court decided
appeals in two civil proceedings having some bearing on the law of searches
and seizures. Boyd v. Christy, 333 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1960); Boyd v. General
Pruess, 225 Mich. 115, 195 N.W. 684 (1923); Cofer v. State, 152 Miss. 761, 118

Motors Acceptance Corp., 330 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. 1959).
128. TENN.CONST.art. I, § 7.

1078

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

implying that other searches and seizures may be lawfully made. 12
Statutory provisions have therefore been enacted to authorize
searches and seizures under search warrants, 130 but the common law
remains in force as to searches and seizures without warrants. 131 It
is well established thereby that a search may reasonably be made
without a warrant if incidental to a lawful arrest wherein the apprehending officer has reason to believe that the search is a proper
precaution in the particular case, among other reasons, in order to
preserve incriminating evidence. 132 It is further generally accepted
that a search under such circumstances is not limited to the arrestee's
person but extends also to his immediate surroundings, including, for
example the automobile he is driving at the time of his apprehension,
and if there appears a need therefor may include an exploration of
inside pockets, under the seat, and in the trunk,133 with the privilege
of unlocking where that is necessary. 134 The search of the arrestee's
automobile may be postponed to a more convenient time if the officers
keep possession of it from the time of the arrest. 135 And, while there
has been some confusion on the point, the better rule is that "officers
making an authorized search following an arrest without a warrant
are privileged to seize property having no relation to the offense for
which the arrest was made, but intimately connected with some other
36
crime, if such property is unexpectedly discovered."
With the above principles behind it, the supreme court in Church v.
State, 37 having determined that the plaintiff in error was lawfully
arrested for driving his automobile upon a public street while under
the influence of intoxicants, had no apparent trouble in holding that,
after the arrestee had been taken to jail, the arresting officer was
authorized without a warrant to return to the vehicle to search for
evidence of intoxicants (including under the seat where he had seen
129. State v. Hall, 164 Tenn. 548, 51 S.W.2d 851 (1932).
130. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 40-501 to -517 (1956).

131. Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588 (1922), 20 A.L.R. 639
(1922). For discussions of Tennessee law, see Arnold, Search and Seizure
Problems, 16 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1940); Comment, Search and SeizureTennessee Concepts, 22 TENN. L. REV. 527 (1952).
132. 2 UNDERILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 415 (5th ed. 1956).
133. The need must appear. Therefore, a search of the trunk was unauthorized when undertaken in connection with an arrest for reckless
driving. Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938). On the other
hand, officers were held justified in searching a car for intoxicating liquor
incidental to an arrest for driving while drunk. Fuqua v. State, 175 Tenn.
11, 130 S.W.2d 125 (1939).
134. People v. Garrett, 232 Mich. 366, 205 N.W. 95 (1925). See on the
extent of search permitted as to automobiles, MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 114-28 (1959); Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L.
REV. 509, 617, 619 (1949).

135. Allgaier v. State, 200 Ind. 583, 164 N.E. 315 (1929); Callahan v. State,
42 Okla. Crim. 425, 276 Pac. 494 (1929).
136. Perkins, supra note 134, at 624. See also Goodwin v. State, 148 Tenn.
682, 257 S.W. 79 (1923).
137. 333 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1960).
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the arrestee put something); to seize whiskey found beneath the seat;
to continue the search for intoxicants by unlocking the trunk; and,
while not looking for evidence to connect the arrestee with a burglary
which had been reported, to seize articles discovered in the trunk
which were considered burglary tools.
Further concerning automobiles, it is said that those lawfully
within the country and entitled to use the public highways have a
right to free passage thereon without interruption for search of their
vehicles unless it is known to an officer authorized to search that
there is probable cause for believing that the vehicle he stops contains
contraband goods being illegally transported. 138 In Dobbins v. State 39
an investigator for the State Alcohol Tax Division, Department of
Finance and Taxation, who suspected that automobiles were illegally
transporting whiskey from a certain county and was watching a
public highway leading therefrom for signs to that effect, was held
justified (1) in thinking there was probable cause to believe that
individuals in an automobile sagging in the rear and traveling at a
high rate of speed at 2 a.m. from that direction were transporting
moonshine whiskey; (2) after overtaking them when they attempted
to outrun his state car, in searching without a warrant the trunk of
the car when he smelled the odor of whiskey in that vicinity; and (3)
in seizing fifty gallons of moonshine whiskey discovered therein. In
reaching that result, the court distinguished a previous decision ruling inadmissible in a liquor transportation case whiskey discovered
in the trunk of an automobile stopped for reckless driving,140 there
being no causal connection in the stopping and the search. It also
recognized as sound the holding in another case that an apparently
"loaded" automobile coming from the direction of a locality from
which whiskey is known to be transported illegally did not justify
stopping and searching it, 141 but was able to distinguish the instant
case because of the additional suspicious factors here supporting the
officer's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe the
vehicle was illegally transporting moonshine whiskey.
The court in the Dobbins case further held that two defendants who
were riding in the automobile had no basis for contending that the
search in question was illegal and the evidence taken from the automobile as a result thereof was inadmissible, because they were not the
owners of the automobile and also were not in possession of it. This
holding, too, is consistent with Tennessee judicial precedent' 42 and
138. 4 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 84, at § 1537.
139. 332 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1960).

See also Erby v. State, 181 Tenn. 647,

184 S.W.2d 14 (1944); Farmer v. State, 148 Tenn. 216, 254 S.W. 552 (1923).
140. Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938).
141. Harlow v. State, 159 Tenn. 537, 20 S.W.2d 1045 (1929).

142. Templeton v. State, 196 Tenn. 90, 264 S.W.2d 565 (1954); Allen v.
State, 161 Tenn. 71, 29 S.W.2d 247 (1930).
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general authority143 to the effect that the right to immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and can only be
asserted by one whose rights as owner, lessee, or the like, of the
premises searched have been allegedly violated.
(d) Indictments and Presentments.-The theory was advanced in
Jones v. State' 44 that, since the issuance of a warrant is the commencement of a prosecution, any prosecution is confined to the matters alleged in the warrant, and that therefore if the warrant is void,
there can be no valid indictment for a correct and legal charge of
any other offense. Finding no authority in Tennessee decisions to
support that proposition, the court rejected it, holding that any
question as to the sufficiency of the warrant is foreclosed by the
return of an indictment, because when the probability of the commission of a crime has been called to the attention of the grand jury
even by a defective or void warrant it is within the inquisitorial
power of the grand jury to investigate the matter further and to
find a valid indictment on the basis of whatever facts their investigations uncover.
An individual convicted of involuntary manslaughter for killing two
people in an automobile accident raised in an appeal in error the
following question: Should an indictment have been quashed as
duplicitous because it alleged that the defendant killed two people in
an automobile accident and therefore charged two offenses? Because
the criminal intent in the offense involved here is an imputed disregard of the safety of all persons who might be in the way of a recklessly and unlawfully driven automobile, and since no act or intent
could be charged against the defendant as affecting either of the
persons killed to the exclusion of the other, the court held that the
defendant was guilty of a single unlawful act with a single criminal
intent, that he therefore could be punished for only one offense, and
that the indictment is thus not duplicitous. 145 With this decision Tennessee continues to maintain the minority position, 146 for the majority
rule is that where two or more persons are killed or injured by a
single criminal act in the operation of a motor vehicle there are as
47
many separate and distinct offenses as persons injured or killed.
143. E.g., United States v. Eversole, 209 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1954); Scoggins
v. United States, 92 App. D.C. 29, 202 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1953); McBride v,
State, 221 Miss. 508, 73 So. 2d 154 (1954); State v. Rodgers, 364 Mo. 247, 260
S.W.2d 736 (1953); Archer v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 131, 259 P.2d 540 (1953).
144. 332 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1960).
145. Crocker v. State, 325 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. 1959).
146. See the court's prior statement of this position in Smith v. State, 159
Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929).
147. See 1 WHARTON, CRIMVINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 152 (12th ed. Anderson
1957), listing Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Washington as holding with the majority rule, and Iowa, New
Jersey, and Tennessee, with the minority position.
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It should be noted that a holding on this question bears directly on
former jeopardy, for the minority (Tennessee) rule makes the
acquittal or conviction of an offense, although based on the injury or
death of only one of the victims, a bar to prosecutions based on the
injury or death of other persons in the transaction; whereas the
majority rule makes possible the institution of successive prosecutions
against the individual whose act killed or injured several persons
without running afoul of the former jeopardy bar.
On the basis of an 1871 precedent, 148 the court ruled that it is not
necessary that each count of an indictment conclude with the phrase
"against the peace and dignity of the State."' 49
Several indictment problems were raised by Church v. State.150 It
was held there that the offense of "burglary in the third degree" was
sufficiently charged even though the title of the offense did not appear
in the indictment, because the language used therein to define the
offense for which defendant was charged is the same as that used
in the code definition of burglary in the third degree. 151
A second indictment problem in the Church case concerned the
fact that, whereas the indictment alleged defendant's conduct in
terms only of the first paragraph of the code section on burglary in
the third degree (for which punishment of from 3 to 10 years is provided), the trial judge instructed the jury both on that and also on
a second paragraph of the code section (for which punishment of
from 3 to 21 years is provided) and charged them to fix the defendant's punishment between the latter limits if they found him guilty
of conduct specifically proscribed in the second paragraph of the code
section (although such conduct was nowhere alleged in the indictment). The jury found defendant guilty of burglary in the third
degree in terms of the second paragraph of the code section and fixed
his prison term at not more than 5 years. Although the maximum
period of the penalty so fixed came within the limitations prescribed
in both paragraphs, the court concluded that the jury had in mind
the second paragraph and had consequently found defendant guilty
of an offense not charged in the indictment. The court very properly
held that reversible error had thereby been committed and that it
was not harmless error when a constitutional right of the defendant
had been invaded. The state constitution requires that the substance
of an indictment state "the nature and cause of the accusation.' u5 2
This statement must be in certain and precise terms and describe the
facts which constitute the crime, and "one indicted cannot be called
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Rice v. State, 50 Tenn. 215 (1871).
Hopper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1959).
333 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1960).
See also Logan v. State, 70 Tenn. 222 (1879).
TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
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upon to defend an indictment for more than is charged in the indict3
ment., 5
In Church, a third basis for attacking the indictment was that there
was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof because
(1) the indictment charged that the offense for which defendant was
tried occurred during the night time, which the state failed to prove,
and (2) the indictment failed to allege the ownership of the building
in which the office was located which allegedly suffered the burglary.
The court found no merit in this assignment of error, because (1) the
time of the statutory offense of burglary in the third degree is immaterial since it can be committed at any time, day or night, and is
not an essential element of the offense, and since an allegation as to
time of day would be unnecessary to give the defendant full notice
of the charge of burglary in the third degree such additional language
can be disregarded as surplusage; 154 and (2) the allegation in the
indictment of ownership to be in the tenant was proper, burglary
being an offense against the actual occupant rather than the title
holder of the premises. 55
In another case, it was alleged that there was fatal variance when
the indictment alleged that the offense (rape) was committed on
April 25, 1957, when in fact, according to the evidence, it was committed on April 24, 1957. This contention was rejected, the court
stating the rule as follows: "The offense must be proved to have
been committed prior to the finding of the indictment and that the
offense was committed within the time specified by the statute of
limitations, and except where a special date is essential, or where
time is of the essence of the offense, the time of the commission of
the offense as averred in the indictment is not material and the proof
is not confined to the time charged."'156
And in a prosecution for receiving and concealing stolen property,
the court held that it made no difference that, instead of all of the
stolen goods being the property of a specific individual named in the
indictment, some of them belonged to a corporation of which he was
the sole stockholder. The variance is not fatal, the court ruled, as
the gravamen of this crime is that the receiver knows he is receiving
15 7
property stolen from someone.
The contention was made in Blackwood v. State' 58 that the instru153. Huffman v. State, 200 Tenn. 487, 495, 292 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1956). For
discussion, see Earle, Criminal Law and Procedure-1957 Tennessee Survey,
10 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (1957).
154. Pelmer v. State, 187 Tenn. 527, 216 S.W.2d 25 (1948); Harris v. State,
82 Tenn. 485 (1884).
155. Young v. State, 185 Tenn. 596, 206 S.W.2d 805 (1947).
156. State ex rel. Tines v. Bomar, 329 S.W.2d 813, 815 (1959).
157. O'Brien v. State, 326 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1959).
158. 325 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1959).
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ment charging defendant with the offense of embezzlement by a
public officer was faulty because (1) it did not inform him who the
prosecutors were and (2) it could not be determined whether the
instrument was a presentment or an indictment. The court had
several quick answers in overruling this argument. Without setting
out the instrument in the opinion, the court classified it as a presenti 59
ment according to the definition of State v. Davidson, and stated
that the general code requirement that a prosecutor be marked on an
6
indictment 60 does not apply to presentments.' ' But then, the court
remarked, even if the instrument were an indictment, the code specifies that the offense charged here is one of those for which a prose62
Finally, the
cutor is not required to be marked on the indictment
court held that, even if the contention were a good one, seasonable
objection had not been made when the instrument had already been
read to the jury and the defendant had plead to the merits; i.e., the
63
motion to quash came too late.
Although the well-nigh universal practice in Tennessee has been
for a presentment to be signed personally by all of the grand jurors,
there is no statutory requirement to that effect and no case of record
holding that such must be done. When the plaintiff in error in Stoots
v. State6 4 contended that the presentment in his case was invalid
because several of the grand jurors did not sign it but observed Haywood County's local practice of allowing a single grand juror to act
as secretary for the body in affixing signatures for them all, the
supreme court overruled the argument after determining that the
weight of authority is to the effect that presentments need not be
signed by grand jurors in the absence of a statutory requirement.
Furthermore, the court observed that "no earthly harm" had been
done to the plaintiff in error by the procedure followed, and the
Harmless Error Statute 165 was sufficient to save the lower court's
judgment from reversal on this point. Chief Justice Neil agreed that
the judgment should be affirmed because the defendant had not been
prejudiced by the matter complained of; but, dissenting in part on
the question of whether the presentment should have been signed
jurors, he expressly disapproved of the
individually by all the grand
66
practice.
County
Haywood
159. 171 Tenn. 347, 350, 103 S.W.2d 22, 23-24 (1937). See other cases cited
in CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT §§ 723-24 (7th ed. 1951).
160. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-1704 (1956).
161. See also State v. Davidson, 171 Tenn. 347, 103 S.W.2d 22 (1937).
162. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-1705(18) (1956).
163. See also Driscoll v. State, 191 Tenn. 186, 232 S.W.2d 28 (1950).
164. 325 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1959).
165. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-117 (1956).
166. 325 S.W.2d at 539-40.
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3. Trial.-(a) Speedy Trial.-The defendant in Gerchman v. State167
assigned as error that he had not been accorded his constitutional
right to a "speedy public trial"' 68 when he was not tried until approximately a year after he was charged with committing an offense.
Determining from the record that the defendant had been indicted
under several different indictments for various thefts or burglaries,
that he had been tried on several of them (the trial court stated at the
rate of one each term of court), that he was serving time on a previous
conviction at the time this case was originally tried, and that the
trial court had a crowded docket which it had taken up as fast as it
could, the supreme court overruled the assignment. Although even
a person already in prison under another conviction is entitled to the
protection of the invoked constitutional provision, the court stated
that a trial might reasonably be delayed longer in his case than when
a person is awaiting trial in jail and would be released upon acquittal.16 9

(b) Trial by jury: Waiver.-Can a defendant legally waive a jury
trial upon an indictment charging him with a felony? The question
had not been decided in any reported Tennessee case prior to 1960.
And, although neither of the cases in which the problem was raised
during the past year resolve it either, they may provide clues
for the state bar as to the present court's disposition toward it. In
State v. Moore,170 the court merely noted that there is a "considerable
difference of opinion between text-writers and courts" on the question, but found it unnecessary therein to resolve it. The opinion in
Jones v. States,'7 ' however, includes a more extensive comment.
There the court noted that the bench and bar of this state has tended
to assume that the relevant sections of the Tennessee Constitution 172
on the matter confer rights which cannot be waived; but it cited
authority to the effect that waiver of the right to counsel is permitted'73 (the same is true of the right to a speedy trial, immunity
from double jeopardy, and extradition requirements 7 4 ) and that an
accused may waive any statutory or constitutional provision intended
167. 332 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn. 1960).
168. TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9.

169. Citing Arrowsmith v. State, 121 Tenn. 480, 175 S.W. 545 (1915), and
other authorities.
170. 332 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1960).
171. 332 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1960).
172. "That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . ." TENN.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; "That no man shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty or
property, but by the judgment of his peers on the law of the land." TENN.
CONST. art. 1, § 8; "The accused hath the right to . . . a speedy public trial,
by an impartial jury...." TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
173. Edgemon v. State, 195 Tenn. 496, 260 S.W.2d 262 (1953).
174. State ex tel. Lea v. Brown, 166 Tenn. 669, 64 S.W.2d 841 (1933).
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for his benefit. 7 5 But it may be of the opinion that a right of the
magnitude of trial by jury can be waived only if "a statute authorizes
it under proper safeguards,"'7 6 because in the Jones case it held that
"since there is no such statute" the trial court in that homicide prosecution did not err in refusing the request of defendant's counsel for
77
waiver of a trial by jury in order to stand trial before the judge.
Even if it were legally possible otherwise for an accused to waive
trial by jury, waiver would not be effective where a fine in excess of
fifty dollars is to be imposed, in view of the constitutional provision
that "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall
exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his
peers."' 7 8 In the event that a jury-waived trial reached the point of
the judge finding the defendant guilty of an offense carrying a minimum penalty by statute of more than fifty dollars, he would have to
impanel a jury to fix the fine within the statutory limits. 7 9
(c) Selection of Jurors.-In Smith v. State,180 a local Teamsters'
Union business agent and his assistant, who had been prosecuted for
conspiring to take lives and to commit first-degree murder by
allegedly shooting at trucks operated by independent contractors for
a trucking line during a strike called by the union against that line,
contended that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow
the district attorney general to ask prospective jurors on the voir dire
if they knew Dave Beck, Jimmy Hoffa, or other high Teamster officials, on the theory that the only purpose of the questions was to
prejudice the jury against the defendants. The contention was rejected by the supreme court which held that such questions were
consistent with the purpose of the voir dire examination to advise
counsel of a juror's qualification or bias, since questions as to occupation, acquaintanceships, and associations are necessary to reveal
freedom from bias, and also to enable one intelligently to use his
peremptory challenges.
It has been said that, a full knowledge of all material and relevant
matters being essential to a fair exercise of the right of a party to
challenge either for cause or peremptorily, a prospective juror has
the duty on the voir dire examination "to make full and truthful
answers to such questions as are asked him, neither falsely stating any
fact nor concealing any material matter," and that "if he falsely
represents his . . .situation, or conceals a material fact relevant to
the controversy, he is guilty of misconduct . . . prejudicial to the
175. Ibid.
176. State v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 479, 287 S.W.2d 71 (1956).
177. 332 S.W.2d at 666.

178. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 14.
179. State v. Moore, 332 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1960) (dictum).
180. 327 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1959).
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party, for it impairs his right to challenge."' 181 The Smith case 182 also
involved the applicability of these principles. In response to questions
a prospective juror therein testified that at one time he had worked
as a route supervisor for a dairy company, in which connection he
had known one of the Smith defendants on sight because of his
work with members of the Teamsters' Union. He also testified that in
such capacity he (the juror) had dealt with that union but was not
connected with it, and that he was a member of a union at the time
but not of the Teamsters' Union. Before the supreme court, defendants argued that it was prejudicial error for the trial court not to
declare a mistrial when it further developed that that juror had
failed to disclose during his examination the facts that at a former
time he was a member of the Teamsters' Union, was fired, and had
a fight with a Teamster. The court, however, rejected defendants'
theory that the juror was therefore either actually biased or that
bias must be presumed. Finding that the juror's testimony was fair,
it held that bias was not shown from former union membership and
associations. Besides, remarked the court, if defendants were not
satisfied with the juror they were in a good position to inquire into
his previous union connections before they accepted him.
It was assigned as error in another case' 83 that, as an act of discretion, the trial court had allowed the state peremptorily to challenge
the seventh juror accepted, after twelve jurors had been selected and
after defendant had exercised all of his peremptory challenges. The
supreme court overruled the assignment upon finding no evidence
184
that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury and trial.
Unusual imagination would not be needed to visualize situations in
which an original juror number seven might be, or seem to be, more
satisfactory to a party than a replacement against whom a peremptory
challenge is not now available and against whom sufficient grounds
cannot be mustered for a challenge for cause. But, the general rule
being that one is not entitled to have a particular juror sit in his
trial, a dissatisfied party stands little chance of making out reversible
error unless he can show unfairness or partiality resulting from the
selection finally made, or, perhaps, that the rejected juror was for
185
special reasons highly desirable.
(d) Evidence.-Evidentiary questions involved in some of the criminal cases of the past year are treated elsewhere in this survey, 18 6 but
181. 5 WHARToN, op. cit. supra note 147, at § 1997.

182. Smith v. State, supra note 180.

183. Hopper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1959).

184. Citing Nelson v. State, 200 Tenn. 462, 292 S.W.2d 727 (1956).
185. Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 1197, 1220 (1960).

186. Ibid.
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as a convenience to the reader.

(e) Conduct of Jury.-Because of the rule that the verdict must be
founded solely upon evidence delivered in open court in the presence
of the judge and the parties, the Tennessee Supreme Court from an
early time took a dim view of jurors reading newspaper articles not
in evidence concerning events at issue in the trial and concerning the
trial itself. As the court said in Carter v. State,'88 in reversing and
remanding a manslaughter conviction because some of the jury
therein read newspaper articles about the case during the trial: "If
facts are illegally before the jury, which may have prejudiced the
prisoner, he is entitled to a new trial. The value of the jury trial
depends upon guarding jurors against any and every influence other
189
than such as arises from evidence legitimately before them."'
187. Alibi, Measure of persuasion: Smith v. State, 327 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn.

1959) (fact for jury, must be established "clearly, certainly, and fully").
Best evidence rule: Blackwood v. State, 325 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1959) (error,
if any, of admitting copies cured when originals produced later in trial).
Coerced statements: Kasper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 664 (Tenn. 1959) (error, if
any, was harmless when trial judge was satisfied witnesses were telling truth
in court, despite alleged coercion by officers in obtaining pre-trial statements).
Corroboration of accomplices' testimony: Garton v. State, 332 S.W.2d 169
(Tenn. 1960) (requirement satisfied by numerous material facts otherwise
proven). Hearsay: Blackwood v. State, supra (extra-judicial admission receivable against defendant); Hooper v. State, 325 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1959)
(testimony by custodian admissible concerning contents of official written
statements); Smith v. State, supra (extra-judicial admission that defendant
had been advised by an unnamed person to go before a congressional committee and "take the fifth amendment" held receivable). Motive, proof of:
Caruso v. State, 326 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1958) (evidence as to tools commonly
used in opening safes and found in defendant's car admissible in larceny
prosecution to show felonious motive in moving safe). Offer of proof: Miller
v. State, 332 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1960) (error, if any, in judge's sustaining
objection to question on cross-examination not reversible in the absence of a
showing in the record what the examiner expected the answer to be). Other
crimes: Birdsell v. State, 330 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959) (defendant cannot object
to evidence by the state of such other offenses as were inquired about by his
own counsel on his direct examination); Garton v. State, supra (error, if any,
in trial judge refusing to permit defense counsel to cross-examine state's witness about a previous conviction was harmless where sufficient other evidence
present to support verdict and judgment); McGee v. State, 332 S.W.2d 507
(Tenn. 1960) (admissible for impeachment purposes to show a prior conviction of defendant of a crime involving moral turpitude through cross
examination of him, despite pendency of appeal thereon; assault to commit
murder by "pistol whipping" a young girl involved moral turpitude). Prior
conduct in same series: Birdsell v. State, supra (evidence of defendant's
earlier conduct in his continuous dealings with minor admissible in prosecution for contributing to delinquency of a minor). Res gestae: Church v.
State, 333 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1960) (not error to permit state to introduce
evidence of breaking open a safe in an office, although not alleged in an
indictment which charged burglary for breaking into the office, because parts
of the same transaction and of the res gestae).
188. 77 Tenn. 440 (1882).
189. Id. at 446. Cf., the dissenting opinion of Justice McFarland in the same
case: "Conceding that the affidavits are sufficient to show that some of the
jury read one of the newspaper articles, I can not see that we ought to
assume that they were, or even might have been thereby prejudiced against
the prisoner ....
I do not discover anything in the newspaper article . . . of
an inflamatory character or calculated to prejudice the prisoner's case with
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In the recent Smith' 90 case, the court discounted the importance
of the Carter case and similar cases for having been decided before
the enactment of the Harmless Error Statute. 191 Now, the court
stated, although the reading of a prejudicial article may still be a
ground for a new trial, it can be overcome by showing that the jury
was not influenced by the report, "irrespective of its contents."'192 A
motion for a new trial was made in Smith on the grounds, inter aia,
that the jurors therein read newspapers which they had been allowed
to bring into their hotel rooms, saw newspapers on the street, and
listened to radio and viewed television-all outside of court. The
supreme court held that a denial of the motion was not error or "at
least was harmless error,"193 upon reviewing evidence heard on the
motion, including the testimony of jurors that they engaged in the
challenged activities in a casual manner, often seeing little but headlines; that one of them in reading an article found it "boring" and
only what he had heard all day; and that nothing which they saw or
heard outside the courtroom influenced their verdict in the slightest.
Additionally, the court pointed out that there was nothing in the
record to show that the members had seen in the newspapers anything relative to the trial other than what one of the defendants himself voluntarily testified to before the jury in court-among other
things, that he had seen his picture in the paper with a big number
across it.
The problem of keeping the criminal jury "locked up" or "sealed"
from outside influences was discussed in another case in which the
officer having custody left the jury unattended at times in order to
procure for them cigarettes, cold drinks, and the like, making it
possible for them in his absence and without his knowledge to witness
a television newscast, although counsel for defense at the trial offered no proof that the jurors had done so and declined to question
the jury, especially if we assume that they possessed even a moderate degree
of intelligence and honesty. The article contains nothing to indicate the
drift of public opinion as to the prisoner's guilt, and nothing as to his
character, calculated to create prejudice against him. It purports mainly to
be a history of the progress of the trial, a matter about which the jury were
certainly as well informed as the author of the article. If it purports to
state any facts pertinent to the issue before the jury, they are certainly
stated in very general terms, The jurors must be supposed to know that a
newspaper reporter . . .is not speaking from a personal knowledge of the
facts .... They are . . .solemnly sworn to try the case upon the law and
evidence .... The jury are universally cautioned by the presiding judge to
determine the case alone upon the evidence, and to disregard all outside
influences. After all this, to suppose that a jury could, in any degree, be
influenced in their verdict by a newspaper article containing nothing more
than the one in question, is to attribute to them a degree of weakness scarcely
consistent with their fitness for their position." Id. at 447-48.
190. Smith v. State, supranote 187.
191. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-117 (1956).
192. 327 S.W.2d at 321.
193. Ibid.
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the jury on the matter. Holding that the trial judge had properly
refused a mistrial on this ground, the court stated that, as in the
case of newspaper reading, the burden is on the defendant to show
that television viewing prejudiced the jury. And it observed:
We are not living in prehistoric ages and a jury cannot be kept in a
sealed box during the time that they are participating in the trial of a
criminal case. The jury is sworn to . . . try the case on the evidence as
introduced in open court and the charge of the court as to the law
thereon and unless there be some more showing or semblance of prejudicial matter getting to the jury that might influence them than there
is in the present case clearly it should not be held as erroneous and
reversible.194
As pointed out elsewhere in this survey, 195 the strict common law
rule that any separation of the jury vitiates the verdict has generally
been abandoned in favor of the qualification now that some prejudicial effect of the separation must be shown. The Tennessee Supreme
Court during the past year held in two cases that it was not an
improper separation of jurors to permit them to occupy separate hotel
rooms during the course of trial. In one of these cases, Smith v.
State,196 emphasizing that the jurors had been under the supervision
of a court appointed officer who was able to view all the rooms from
a single hotel corridor and that all of them testified to no outside
influence upon their verdict, the court cited as controlling its recent
decision in Steadman v. State19 7 in which "it was shown that there
was no prejudice to the defendant and thus that their separation...
did not vitiate the verdict."'198 In the other, Blackwood v. State,199
the court in reaching its decision pointed to facts that the jurors were
under the charge of two officers and that all of them testified that not
only had they not discussed the case with anyone, but that no one had
even attempted to talk with them. Since the court in the 1955 Steadman decision adhered to precedents holding that when the fact of
separation is established the verdict is prima facie vicious and that,
in the absence of an explanation by the state, "the mere fact of
separation is sufficient ground for a new trial, '20 0 it is important to
note that the burden is on the state to show that the jurors had no
communication with other persons. One way to do that, of course, is
to have the jurors testify to such effect. However, the Steadman case
194. O'Brien v. State, 326 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Tenn. 1959).
195. Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 1197, 1226 (1960).
196. 327 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1959).
197. 199 Tenn. 66, 282 S.W.2d 777 (1955); Earle, Criminal Law and Procedure-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 980, 987 (1956).
198. 327 S.W.2d at 322.
199. 325 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1959).
200. 199 Tenn. at 70, 282 S.W.2d at 779, citing Hines v. State, 27 Tenn. 597,
601 (1848).
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is also authority for the proposition that showing the jurors to have
been under the care of an officer sworn to keep them apart from other
individuals and not to allow communications between them and others
raises the presumption that the officer has done his duty, which, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, is pre-eminent and overcomes the prima facie presumption based upon the mere fact of
separation. 20' In summary, unless the defendant can show tampering
with a juror or jurors, the prima facie presumption created by separation alone-that the verdict is vicious-can be overcome by evidence
of the state of non-communication with others or by showing that the
jury was under the supervision of an officer which raises the stronger
presumption that he fulfilled his duty to prevent communications
with outsiders.
(f) Instructions.-The supreme court in Church v. State20 2 was
clearly correct in holding that it was reversible error for the trial
judge in a prosecution for third degree burglary to include in his
charge to the jury instructions concerning an offense not set out in
the indictment, opening or attempting to open a safe. The same
result should follow in any other case wherein instructions are given
on an offense not charged in the indictment.
It was held not to have been error, however, for a judge in another
criminal case 203 to refuse to instruct the jury on lesser included
offenses embraced in the crime charged in the indictment, when the
lesser included offenses would have been barred by the statute of
limitations. In fact, conviction of a lesser offense then would have
entitled the defendants to be discharged, 20 4 and the supreme court,
by dictum, indicated that it probably would have been error if the
trial court had instructed the jury on a lesser included offense under
these circumstances.
Instruction on circumstantial evidence is not necessary in a criminal
prosecution when there is direct evidence of the fact charged, and
205
the court so held again during the past year in two cases.
The Tennessee Constitution provides that "The Judges shall not
charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law."206 At the conclusion of a trial upon an
indictment for practicing dentistry without a license, the trial judge
instructed the jury as follows: "I charge you that the defendant J. E.
201. 199 Tenn. at 71-72, 282 S.W.2d at 779.
202. 333 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1960).

203. 327 S.W.2d at 326.

204. Hickey v. State, 131 Tenn. 112, 174 S.W. 269 (1915); 1 WHARTON,
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 180 (12th ed. Anderson 1957).

CRmNnAL

205. Birdsell v. State, 330 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959); Eager v. State, 325 S.W.2d

815 (Tenn. 1959).
206. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 9.
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Hooper, who is not a licensed dentist.., was engaged in the practice
of dentistry, in violation of Section 63-501 to Section 63-558, Tennessee Code Annotated." The supreme court held the instruction to be
reversible error for violating the quoted constitutional provision; it
was not saved by a subsequent instruction that "You must not
imagine that the court has any opinion in regard to the facts, for it is
your duty to find them, and I have attempted to read this charge so as
to define to you the law without indicating any opinion about the
facts whatever"; and it was not harmless error even though the
defendant had not denied that he did not have a license.2 0 7 The
mandatory language of the constitution very clearly covers such a
situation as this, where the defendant has plead not guilty to a charge,
to prohibit the judge from stating to the jury the ultimate findings
of fact which they were impaneled to make concerning the charge.
(g) Verdict.-The supreme court has repeatedly held that trial
courts have no authority to direct a verdict 208 and therefore that it
is not error to overrule a defendant's motion for such. 20 9 This rule
was followed as a matter of course in the Church case.2 10 What, however, if a trial court in a criminal prosecution granted a directed
21
verdict of acquittal, would that be reversible error? In State v. Moore, 1
at the conclusion of the state's evidence, the defendant moved the
court "to quash and dismiss the indictment because of an illegal
search," the court sustained the motion and adjudged "that said
indictment is hereby quashed and dismissed," and the supreme court
allowed the state an appeal. It being conceded by all parties that the
indictment was entirely valid, the supreme court stated that a motion
to "quash" was not appropriate. But the court interpreted defense
counsel's use of the word as a "slip of the tongue" and further stated
that "properly construed, the motion was in fact that a verdict for the
defendant be directed because the evidence upon which the prosecution is based was the result of an illegal search." Finally, the court
concluded, "The error, if any, therefore, in proceeding to trial without
a jury was harmless, in that it was the court's duty to determine
whether the search in question was legal and to. instruct the jury to
that effect. And it would have been the jury's duty to follow that
207. Hooper v. State, 325 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1959).

208. E.g., Ivy v. State, 197 Tenn. 650, 277 S.W.2d 363 (1955); Taylor v.

State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235 S.W.2d 818 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918 (1951).

209. Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583, 315 S.W.2d 99 (1958). This rule goes
to the extreme of including cases where there is no evidence to sustain a
verdict of guilty, in which event the case is remanded not to direct the
lower court to enter a verdict of not guilty but with the suggestion that the
district attorney general nolle the case if no further evidence is produced.
Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. 1959).

210. Supra note 202.

211. 332 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1960).
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instruction with the same result, acquittal, as that reached by the
Trial Judge. 2 12 This decision accords with common sense, justice,
and sound judicial administration, if not strictly with the precedents
holding that trial courts in this state may not direct a verdict. One
may agree with Professor Morgan that "it is difficult, if not impossible,
to understand 213 why Tennessee courts continue to follow the traditional practice. The decision in the Moore case leaves room for the
214
hope that our state may eventually join most states in this country
in authorizing the trial courts to direct verdicts of not guilty.
The verdict that "we, the jury, find the defendant guilty of assault
and battery with the intent to commit rape as charged in the indictin
ment, and fix his punishment at not more than twelve (12) years 215
the State Penitentiary," was assigned as error in Harris v. State,
defendant contending that it was void and unauthorized by law in
that it failed to state all of the elements of the offense and no legal
judgment could therefore be predicated upon it. The supreme court
properly rejected this contention, holding that the verdict was valid,
and the judgment also therefore valid, because it was sufficient that
the verdict here incorporated by reference the indictment, the sufficiency of which was not questioned by the defendant.
In the Smith case 216 on the hearing of defendants' motion for a new
trial because the jurors had occupied separate hotel rooms, seen and
read newspapers, and listened to the radio and saw television, defendants put the jurors on the witness stand to show what happened.
Defendants then objected to the district attorney general's questioning
of the jurors as to whether or not their verdict had been affected by
information received outside of court on the ground that the jury
was thereby being allowed to impeach its verdict. The supreme court
however upheld the challenged procedure on three bases: (1) the
jury was put on by defendants to show that their verdict had been
influenced by outside contacts, and it was proper to show by their
answers to the district attorney general's questions that it had not;
(2) the effect was not to impeach the verdict, but to show that it
had not been improperly influenced and instead had been reached
solely on the basis of law and evidence heard in court; (3) it was
proper to question them to overcome any presumption that the verdict had been affected by outside influences raised by defendants'
212. Id. at 177.

213. Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13
REv. 1197, 1224 (1960).

214. 5 WHARTON, op. cit. supranote 204, § 2075.
215. 332 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1960).

216. Supra note 187.
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showing of outside contacts. The correctness of this result can hardly
217
be seriously doubted.
Cribbs v. State218 was one of those rare cases in which the appellate
court reverses a conviction because it agrees with the defendant's contention (apparently offered routinely in many cases) that the evidence preponderates against a verdict of guilty. 219
4. Penalties.-An individual charged with violating the statutory
provision that "Any person who shall commit an assault and battery
upon a female under the age of twelve (12) years, with the intent
to unlawfully carnally know her, shall on conviction be punished as
in case of rape 220 was found guilty by a jury which fixed his punishment at ten years in the penitentiary. The defendant brought error
contending that punishment for conviction of the offense charged
should have been fixed according to the provisions of another code
section that "If any person assault another, with intent to commit...
any felony or crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary,
where the punishment is not otherwise prescribed, he shall, on conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding
five (5) years."221 The supreme court overruled the contention, 222
pointing out that the latter section applies only "where the punishment is not otherwise prescribed," whereas the punishment for the
offense of which defendant was convicted is "otherwise prescribed"
to be "as in case of rape"; i.e., electrocution unless the jury commutes
the punishment to life imprisonment or for a period not less than ten
years.22 This would seem to be the only possible reasonable construction that could have been made of the statutes involved.
Upon finding an accused guilty of petit larceny, a jury assessed his
punishment at confinement in the county workhouse for a period of
not less than nine months. On appeal it was assigned as error that
the sentence was void for not including a fine as required in the
statutory provision that "In all cases of petit larceny . . .the court
may, in the event of conviction, on the recommendation of the jury,
substitute, in lieu of punishment in the penitentiary, fine and im-

217. On impeachment of verdict, see
485 (1947).
218. 325 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. 1959).

ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM

ARREST TO APPEAL

219. The reader is referred to Justice Tomlinson's opinion setting out the
evidence in the case, particularly the testimony of witnesses, too extensive
for review here. The opinion concludes with an appropriate reference to
Wigmore's observation that "some of the most tragic miscarriages of justice
have been due to testimonial errors" because of "suggestion." 3 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 786a (3d ed. 1940).
220. TENN. CODE Am. § 39-606 (1956).
221. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-603 (1956).

222. Johnson v. State, 330 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1959).
223.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-3702 (1956).
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prisonment in the county jail."224 Stating that the phrase "fine and
imprisonment" is "conjunctive and cannot fairly be construed to be
disjunctive or alternative," the supreme court reversed the judgment
225
and remanded the case.
The code provides that in no case shall a person convicted of a
felony be confined in the penitentiary for less than a year, but that,
whenever the minimum punishment for an offense is imprisonment
in the penitentiary for one year and the jury thinks in a particular
case less punishment is merited, "the jury may punish" by confinement in the county jail or workhouse for a period less than twelve
months. 226 It is also provided that in cases of petit larceny and
receiving goods under the value of $100 (for which the minimum
punishment prescribed is a one year penitentiary term)22 7 "the court
may, in the event of conviction, on the recommendation of the jury,
substitute for punishment in the penitentiary a fine and imprisonment
22
in the county jail."228 This means, said the court in Hopper v. State, 9
that in the case of the specified lesser felonies the jury has the choice
on conviction to fix the punishment by confinement in the county
jail or workhouse for a period of less than twelve months or in its
discretion to recommend that the judge fix the punishment by confinement in the county jail. The trial judge in the Hopper case had
charged the jury that, if they found defendant guilty of the statutory
offense of embezzlement by public officers, for which punishment was
provided "as in case of larceny,"2 30 they could recommend that the
court fix the punishment at confinement in the county jail. Upon
such recommendation the judge had then fixed defendant's punishment at a jail term of 11 months and 29 days. This action was
assigned as error, as a violation of the state constitutional guarantees
of a jury trial; 231 but the supreme court overruled the assignments on
the basis of a precedent in which it had been stated: "It is not essential that the jury assess the punishment, unless the statutes . . .so
direct .... The right to have the jury assess the punishment was
'22
not a part of the right of trial by jury at common law.
Four cases decided by the supreme court during the survey period
involved the procedure of courts allowing credit on a sentence of
confinement in a county or state penal institution, for time spent in
224. TEN. CODE ANN.§ 39-4205 (Supp. 1959).

225. Hartmann v. State, 325 S.W.2d 279 (Tenn. 1959).

See also State v.

White, 132 Tenn. 203, 177 S.W. 478 (1915); Morton v. State, 91 Tenn. 437, 19
S.W. 225 (1892); State v. Ragsdale, 78 Tenn. 671 (1882).
226. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2703 (1956).
227. Tm-N.CODE AxN. §§ 39-4205 (1956), 39-4218 (Supp. 1959).
228. TENx. CODE ANN.§ 39-4205 (Supp. 1959).
229. 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1959).
230. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4231 (1956).
231. TENN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 9.
232. Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100, 106-07, 169 S.W. 558 (1914).
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jail before its execution. Although the opinions are not clear on
this point, it appears that in two of the cases allowing such credit 233
the supreme court acted under a specific statutory provision authorizing it as a matter of discretion to do so as to time spent in jail
pending appeal,2 3 4 and the action was not challenged.
Since, however, in the same code section which expressly authorizes
the supreme court only to allow credit for time in jail pending appeal,
it is also expressly provided that the trial court may in its discretion
allow credit for time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial, 235
what authority, if any, does the supreme court have to allow credit
for time spent in jail before trial? That was the problem in Douglass
v. State,23 6 for, although the defendants therein had not requested the
trial judge to credit their sentence with periods spent in the county
jail while awaiting trial, they petitioned the supreme court to do so
following a decision by the latter court on appeal affirming their
convictions. The petitions were sustained, one justice dissenting. The
opinion for the majority of the court emphasized its broad supervisory
authority over trial court judgments and decrees. Reliance was placed
upon precedents construing (1) the constitution's grant to the
supreme court of appellate jurisdiction 237 as making other state courts
in their action subject to its jurisdictional control "over all such
judgments and decrees as they may render,"23 8 (2) a statutory provision that "the appellate court shall render such judgment or decree
as should have been rendered in the inferior court" 239 as making the
supreme court's judgment that of the lower court,240 and (3) a
statutory requirement in criminal cases that it "render such judgment on the record as the law demands" 241 as empowering it "to
233. Harris v. State, 332 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1960); Birdsell v.

State, 330

S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959).
234. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3102 (Supp. 1959) provides in part as follows:
"In the event the person sentenced appeals his cause to the Supreme Court
and is required to spend time in jail pending the appeal, the Supreme Court
may modify the original sentence allowing a reduction for the time spent in
jail pending an appeal upon a petition setting out the time spent in jail
within five (5) days after the announcement of the Supreme Court decision
provided the facts alleged in the petition are verified by the clerk of the
court where the sentence was imposed. The provisions of this section shall
apply in both felony and misdemeanor cases."
235. "The trial court shall have authority at the time the sentence is
imposed and the defendant committed to the state penitentiary for imprisonment to render the judgment of the court so as to allow the defendant

credit on his sentence for any period of time for which he was committed

and held in the county jail or workhouse pending his arraignment and trial."

Ibid.

236. 330 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1959).
237. TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
238. Hundhausen v. United States Marine Fire Ins. Co., 52 Tenn. 702, 704

(1871).

239. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-326 (1956).
240. Dodds v. Duncan, 80 Tenn. 731, 735 (1884).
241. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3409 (1956).
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modify and reduce imprisonment in criminal cases." 242 Pointing out
that the statutory authorization to the trial court to allow credit for
pre-trial jail time does not expressly exclude or prohibit action by the
supreme court, the court concluded that neither does it by implication impair the revisory jurisdiction in this regard. And in support
of the latter conclusion, the court quoted authority that "The rule for
jurisdiction . . . is, that nothing shall be intended to be out of the
jurisdiction of a Superior Court but that which specially appears
to be S0. '' 243 Justice Tomlinson dissented because the "particular
mode" in which the supreme court may exercise its jurisdiction to
review the action of inferior courts is "'a matter . . . of regulation
by the legislature' within constitutional limits" ;244 the statute in
question "upon its face by necessary and inescapable implication,
withholds from the Supreme Court the authority to give credit for
time spent in jail pending arraignment and trial in the absence of
abuse by the Trial Judge of the authority vested in him;" 245 and
there was no error, mistake, or inadvertance appearing in the record
to have been made by the inferior court in this case in pronouncing
judgment on the jury verdict. Also, it was pointed out that the petition here had not been presented within five days after the supreme
court's decision. Although the statute expressly provides such a
requirement only in regard to petitions for reduction for time spent
in jail pending an appeal, 246 Justice Tomlinson's reasoning may be
that if authority for the supreme court to allow credit for time spent
in jail before trial is to be implied then the five day requirement
should be implied to apply in the latter as well as the former type
of case.
And in an unreported case it was held that the supreme court has
no authority to apply the statutory allowance for time spent in jail
pending appeal when the petition so requesting it has not been filed
247
within five days pursuant to the statutory requirement.
Separate counts of an indictment charged a defendant with third
degree burglary and with being a habitual criminal. Only after a
verdict of guilty on the burglary charge did the trial judge advise the
jury as to the habitual criminal charge. Proof was then offered by
the state solely concerning three former convictions. The supreme
242. Corlew v. State, 181 Tenn. 220, 230, 180 S.W.2d 900, 904 (1944); 19
TENN. L. REV. 807 (1947).

243. Hopper v. Fisher, 39 Tenn. 253, 257 (1858).
244. 330 S.W.2d at 12, quoting Hundhausen v. United States Marine Fire
Ins. Co., supra note 238.
245. 330 S.W.2d at 11.

246. Supra notes 234, 235.
247. Westfall v. State, Criminal Docket, Tenn. Sup. Ct., June 5, 1959.
Cited in Douglass v. State, 330 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tenn. 1959) (dissenting opinion).
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court in Beeler v. State248 rejected defendant's contention that a
fourth conviction was not properly proved, holding that it was not
necessary for the state in order to support the habitual criminal count
to prove as the fourth offense thereunder the immediately preceding
burglary conviction when the same jury tried defendant upon both
charges. The procedure of separating the charges before the same
jury was specifically approved by the court as a fair way to try the
accused.
An unreported federal district court decision rendered during the
survey period, In re Boyd,249 although dealing specifically only with
the original 1939 Habitual Criminal Act of Tennessee, 250 which has
since been revised,251 without doubt has important implications with
regard to several state statutes now on the books. Charles Boyd was
tried in 1940 in a criminal court under an indictment charging him
with robbery, the indictment containing the following further allegation:
And the grand jurors, aforesaid, upon their oath, do further present
that Charles Boyd is a habitual criminal in that he has been convicted of
three crimes, each of said crimes being of a higher grade than petit larcency, and two of same being infamous crimes, said convictions being for
separate offenses committed at different times and on separate occasions.
Boyd was found guilty under the indictment and was given a sentence
on the robbery charge and a sentence of life imprisonment on the
habitual criminal charge.
After completing service of the robbery sentence, he petitioned the
Criminal Court of Davidson County, Tennessee for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that the 1939 Habitual Criminal Act was unconstitutional and that it had been so held by federal court decision.252 That
court sustained the challenge to the act and held that the petitioner
was therefore entitled to be released from custody. But the Tennessee
Supreme Court in 1958 reversed, holding that, although the provision
of the act objected to which had authorized a habitual criminal conviction without formal notice in the indictment or otherwise before
trial that the act would be invoked was void, it could be elided under
the act's severability section so as to save the remainder of the act;
248. 332 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. 1959).

249. In re Boyd, Civil No. 2674, M.D. Tenn., July 10, 1959; af'd sub noma.
Bomar v. Boyd, 281 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1960).

250. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1939, ch. 22, which appeared in WILLiAMS TENN. CODE

ANN. §§ 11863.1-11863.8 (Supp. 1954).
251. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2801 to -2807 (1956).

252. Rhea v. Edwards, 136 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d

850 (6th Cir. 1956). See Earle, CriminalLaw and Procedure-956 Tennessee
Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 980, 989 (1956). The Rhea case was followed by the

Tennessee Supreme Court in the unreported case of Bailey v. State, cited in
Bomar v. State ex rel. Boyd, 312 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tenn. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 921 (1958).
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that with such elision effected the act did provide for notice in that
the defendant was charged with being a habitual criminal; and that,
if it be objected that the indictment did not contain sufficient notice
for failing to set forth the facts and circumstances pertaining to the
prior convictions relied upon at the trial, the indictment was merely
too meager rather than void and a defendant's remedy in such a
situation was a timely motion to quash the indictment for insufficiency.2 5

3

Boyd then petitioned the federal district court for the

Middle District of Tennessee for a writ of habeas corpus, contending
that the entire 1939 act was in contravention to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and therefore void. That court
accepted the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling that the act was
capable of elision as a matter of statutory construction but disagreed
with its holding that after elision the remainder of the act was valid.
Said the court:
[Elven if the provisions of the Act dispensing with notice ...

are elided

...the Act in its revised and amended form would still make authorization for proceeding against a defendant as a habitual criminal only upon
a general charge in the indictment that he was such habitual criminal
as defined in the Act, as set forth in the indictment in the present case,
without supplying any details of time, place, or circumstances in respect to the prior convictions involved. The result is that in accordance
with the terms of the Act a defendant is to be charged with being a
habitual criminal only in the most general terms, and is given no notice
of the specific prior convictions to be relied upon until the records of
such prior convictions are offered in evidence by the prosecution. If such
records of prior convictions contain a name identical to that of the defendant on trial, such identity of names constitutes prima facie evidence
that the defendant is the same person as the person previously convicted,
whether the conviction was in a court of Tennessee or any other state
of the Union, or any territory or foreign country. A defendant thus comes
to trial with prima facie evidence against him which he has no opportunity to refute other than to take the witness stand and to make a denial
if in fact he is not the person involved in the prior conviction. He is
afforded no opportunity to buttress his denial by other evidence.
The consequence of a defendant's inability to refute the accuracy or
correctness of the former convictions so offered by the prosecution is a
judgment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Yet this
is the procedure that is specifically sanctioned and authorized by the
Act itself as originally enacted by the Tennessee legislature even after
the provision dispensing with notice is eliminated under the doctrine of
elision. The Court has no hesitation in holding that such procedure fails
to meet the fundamental requirement of the due process clause of a fair
and reasonable notice of the charge on which a defendant is to be tried.
It is no answer to say that a defendant could move to quash the in253. Bomar v. State ex rel. Boyd, supra note 252. See Miller, Criminal Law
and Procedure-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAND. L. REv. 1224, 1235 (1958);
Overton, ConstitutionalLaw-1958 Tennessee Survey, 11 VAwD. L. Rav. 1194,
1197 (1958).
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dictment if he is not satisfied with the notice, for the fact remains that
a notice in this form contained in the indictment is in exact accordance
with the Act itself and therefore a motion to quash would not lie. For,
the insufficient notice being the notice prescribed by the Act, the Act
itself must fall and any indictment under it must also fall.2M
It is significant to observe, as did the federal court in the Boyd
case, that in 1950 the original Habitual Criminal Act of Tennessee
2 55
Although
was amended so as to provide for more specific notice.
this decision does not apply to the amended act, it has provided an
open door to those persons convicted under the original Act of 1939.
The federal court Boyd decision, moreover, is of considerable
importance in relation to Tennessee's driving-while-under-the-influence act,25 6 which provides for certain penalties for first and second
convictions thereunder of driving while under the influence of an
intoxicant or of narcotic or barbital drugs and mandatorily increased
penalties for third and subsequent convictions thereunder. The 1958
case of Frost v. State25 7 held unconstitutional as violating the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment a former provision of this
act which purported to dispense with notice, in the indictment or
otherwise, concerning prior offenses in the prosecution of second or
subsequent offenders for which the imposition of the increased penalties was authorized. Since the 1939 Habitual Criminal Act was subsequently declared unconstitutional in its entirety by federal court
decree in In re Boyd2 58 because elision of similar invalid provision
still left the act objectionable as to remaining notice provisions, is the
entire code section authorizing increased penalties for third and
subsequent driving-while-under-the-influence offenders unconstitu259
tional? The state supreme court in 1959 in Frost v. State treated
defendant's pre-trial objection to an indictment charging him with
driving-while-under-the-influence after "having been convicted on
four (4) prior offenses of driving an automobile while under the influence of an intoxicant, in the State" (without specifying more as to
the alleged prior offenses) as a timely motion to quash. The trial
254. In re Boyd, supra note 249.
255. "Every person so charged as being an habitual criminal shall be entitled, upon his motion therefor fied in the cause at any time prior to trial,
to demand and to have from the state, a written statement of the felonies,
prior convictions of which form the basis of the charge of habitual criminality,
setting forth the nature of each such felony and the time and place of each
such prior conviction. He shall not, without his consent, be required to go to
trial within twenty (20) days from and after the time when such statement
was supplied to him or to his counsel of record." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2803
(1956).
256. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1031 to -1036 (1956), as amended; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 59-1035 (Supp. 1960).
257. 203 Tenn. 549, 314 S.W.2d 33 (1958). See Kendrick, Criminal Law and
Procedure-1959Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1150 (1959).
258. Supra note 249.
259. 330 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1959).
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court having overruled the-objection, the supreme court reversed
and remanded because the indictment failed to give defendant sufficient notice of that with which he was charged. Noting that the
decision in the Boyd case had been appealed, the supreme court added
that "If the decision of Judge Miller is upheld on appeal, then for the
same reason the entire Act providing for additional punishment in
case of three previous convictions (59-1035 T.C.A. Supplement) will
necessarily have to be held invalid because of a violation of the due
the Court of
process clause of the Federal Constitution. ' 260 And
261
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has affirmed In re Boyd.
It would appear in this area that the next move is for the General
Assembly.
260. Id. at 306-07.

261. Bomar v. Boyd, 281 F.2d 195 (1960).

